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THE CHANGING DIMENSIONS OF
BUSINESS POWERt
CORWIN D. EDWARDS*
From analysis of an earlier and simpler economy, we have inherited a
concept of the nature of the power of a powerful business enterprise. It is
derived from a theoretical model appropriate to localized trading between
consumers and numerous small specialized handicraft producers. According
to this concept, (a) Firms carry on their economic activity in markets, each
of which consists of a group of buyers and sellers who are in direct contact
with one another in transactions that involve a particular product. (b) A
powerful firm is one that monopolizes a market. (c) The monopolist's power
is the result of two conditions: first, that he controls so much of the supply
of the product or service that the buyers of it have no adequate alter-
natives'; and second, that new suppliers desiring to enter the market would
encounter obstacles great enough to prevent them from substantially im-
pairing the monopolist's control of supply.
Economic change is sucking the significance from this type of power.
The number of large business enterprises has increased, so that several such
firms encounter each other in many fields of productive activity. For a single
market, oligopoly instead of monopoly has become the characteristic pattern
of big business. The boundaries of markets are being obscured as a conse-
quence of the increasing size of firms and the development of technology.
Diversification by large business enterprises is reducing significantly the
importance of single markets to them. Changes in the way business power
is manifested are reflecting the increase in the number of big firms, the
blending of markets, and the development of diversification.
The purpose of this essay is to summarize relevant aspects of these
changes in economic structure and behavior and to suggest changes in the
concept of business power appropriate thereto. The discussion will center
tThis article was originally published in Das Unlernehmen in der Rechtsordnung,
festgabe fuir Heinrich Kronstein aus anlass seines 70 Geburtstages, Heraausgegeben von
Kurt H. Biedenkopf, Helmut Coing, Ernst-Joachim Mestmacker, Verlag C. F. Muller,
Karlsruhe, 1967.
* Professor of Economics, University of Oregon. BA., University of Missouri, 1920;
B. Litt., Oxford University, 1924; Ph.D., Cornell University, 1928. Formerly Economist,
Chairman Policy Board, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice.
1 Originally applied to markets for consumer goods, this theory of power has been
extended to markets for commodities and services used by business enterprises as well;
and recognition of the possibility that purchases by a large firm might constitute most
of the demand for a particular kind of commodity or service has led to development of
a concept of monopsony equivalent to that of monopoly. However, since most of the
commodities and services used by business enterprises are consumed by a variety of indus-
tries, even a firm that monopolizes a single industry is unlikely to have monopsony power
over what that industry consumes. Since the monopsony concept has had little practical
importance, this essay will ignore it and will discuss only the power of firms as sellers.
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upon the United States, both because more information is available about
developments there and because I am less familiar with such information
as is available about other countries.
I. INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF LARGE FIRMs: OLIGOPOLY
For various reasons - one being the law against monopoly - big busi-
ness in the United States no longer takes the form of a firm that controls
most of a market or industry and encounters as competitors only firms much
smaller than itself. Instead, the typical pattern is one in which several big
enterprises, more or less comparable in size, occupy most of a field of activ-
ity, while much smaller firms occupy the remainder. This condition, called
by economists oligopoly, is not susceptible to economic appraisals as simple
and confident as economists have applied to monopoly. Analysis is made
difficult by the diversity of oligopoly patterns.
There are many possible combinations of bigness and fewness. The
number of oligopolists may range from two to a considerably larger number.
The oligopolists as a group may make nearly all of the sales or a smaller
part of the total. The relative importance of the firms in the oligopoly
group may vary in numerous ways: One firm (or two or three) may be
outstanding; all oligopolists may be substantially equal; or size and im-
portance may decline by stair-step gradations. The gap in size between the
smallest oligopolist and the next firm may be large or small. Since there is
no reason to believe that the behavior of oligopolists will be uninfluenced
by their number and their aggregate and relative importance, there is little
reason to expect that all oligopolies will have the same power and manifest
it by the same performance.
Ignoring many of these complexities, economists have reasoned that cer-
tain simple oligopoly patterns are likely to result in business conduct akin
to that of monopoly. In one of these patterns, a single firm, larger than its
competitors but not large enough to be a monopolist, becomes a price leader,
while smaller firms follow its decisions; and thereby the downward pres-
sures on prices that might result from the interaction of individual price
decisions are attenuated or destroyed. In other patterns, each of a small
number of oligopolists, keenly aware of the nature and likelihood of retal-
iatory action by the others, refrains from action that will be disadvanta-
geous after the others have retaliated; and thereby the results of oligopoly
decisions come to resemble those that would be produced by collective
agreement.2
Such analyses tend to understate two serious limitations upon the ca-
pacity of a few firms to predict action accurately and respond to it with
appropriate restrictions. The first is the fact that the options open to a firm
2 There are various slightly different analyses resting upon different views as to the
assumptions oligopolists make about the behavior of others. For an analysis that includes
an account of these, see W. FELLNER, COMPETITION AMONG THE FEW (1949).
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are more numerous than the few simple ones recognized in theoretical
models. Even in making a price change, a firm alters list prices, applicable
discounts, and various terms of sale in ways so complex that an observer
sometimes cannot determine whether or not the price was raised or lowered.
The cases in which action can be foreseen with accuracy and in which the
appropriate response would be identical action are probably not numerous.
The second limitation is that technical change increasingly exposes a group
of oligopolists to changing and often uncertain degrees of risk that new
firms may invade their field of action. When both of these limitations are
considered, the probability that oligopolistic price leadership or oligopolistic
forbearance will set the dominant tone of an economy is not great.
Nevertheless, public investigations, legal proceedings, and private studies
have also indicated that where most activity is carried on by a few large
firms, results like those expected from monopoly sometimes appear. Prices
may become unresponsive to environmental change. Declining sales may
lead to restrictions of output and employment instead of price reduction.
3
Price competition may be replaced by expensive competition in sales pro-
motion.4 Planned obsolescence may be used to increase sales by reducing
the useful life of products.5 Whether or not all oligopolists possess economic
power that should be publicly supervised or curbed, some apparently do.
The laws that several European countries have adopted since the Second
World War, unlike the earlier legislation of the United States, recognize
this need. They provide for surveillance over and, where necessary, correc-
tion of the activities of dominant firms, and define dominance so that it
covers oligopoly. In some instances public authority has explicitly recog-
nized that more than one dominant firm may exist in the same industry;
in other instances this view is inherent in the definition given to dominance.
In some instances the law can be invoked if competition among dominant
firms is absent or if parallel action is present, even though the condition
does not arise from agreement. 6 To varying degrees, these laws give govern-
3 See STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON ANTITRUST AND MONOPOLY OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, 88TH CONG., IST SESS., ADMINISTERED PRICES: A COMPENDIUM PUBLIC POLICY 223-24
(Comm. Print 1963); STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON ANTITRUST AND MONOPOLY OF THE SENATE
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., 2D SESS., ADMINISTERED PRICES: AUTOMOBILES 112-15
(Comm. Print 1958).
4 See expenditures of leading firms on advertising as reported in ADVERTISING ACE, Aug.
31, 1964, at 36. In particular instances such expenditures were as much as 10 percent,
12 percent, 22 percent, and 40 percent of gross revenue from sales.
5 In trade publications certain automobile executives have referred candidly to
policies of planned obsolescence, using the phrase. A publisher once told me that the
ideal binding for a textbook would be one that disintegrated at the end of nine months,
but that inability to make sure that disintegration would not come earlier forced him to
use somewhat stronger bindings.
6 Section 22 (2) of the German Act Against Restraints on Competition, for example,
provides that "two or more enterprises are deemed market-dominating insofar as, in
regard to a certain type of goods or commercial services, no substantial competition exists
in fact between them." The Monopolies and Restrictive Practices (Inquiry and Control)
Act of 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, ch. 66, § 3, sched. 2, applies in the United Kingdom where
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ment officials discretionary power to correct such "abuses" as exaction of
excessive prices, unreasonable discrimination in prices or terms of sale, and
unreasonable refusal to sell.
These provisions are recent and have been little used. Their ultimate
potential has not yet become clear. But the diversity of law and practice
from one country to another justifies certain comments. (a) No consensus
has developed as to how dominant power shall be identified. (b) Govern-
ment policy has not sought to cope comprehensively with that power, but
has invoked either an undefined and flexible standard of abuse or more
specific curbs focussed upon a very small number of the ways that economic
power might be used by its possessor. Thus far, policies toward oligopoly
and thought about it have expressed the belief that the monopoly concept
is inadequate to cover market power, but have not provided an alternative
concept capable of becoming the basis for an alternative public policy.
Thought and action have presumed, however, that the problem can be
properly analyzed within the context of the market concept.
II. THE SCOPE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF MARKETS
1. Territorial Markets
The concept of the territorial market is obsolescent. Improvements of
methods of communication and of transport have enabled a seller estab-
lished at any one point to reach a wide sales area, but at a cost that tends
to rise with distance. The costs of such wide-area selling have been deemed
acceptable where they enabled suppliers of goods to get, from larger mech-
anized operations and larger business units, economies and other advantages
that exceeded the extra cost of reaching distant markets; and once large
overhead costs have been incurred, firms have continued to sell in distant
markets so long as, after payment of the direct costs of production and the
costs of sale at a distance, the revenues derived from such sales contributed
appreciably to the payment of the overhead expenses. The distance over
which a firm with wide territorial markets is willing to sell tends to expand
or contract as nearby sales use less or more of the firm's productive capacity.
Thus the sales territory of a single firm must be conceived, not as an area
with exact boundaries, but as one with indefinite and shifting ones.
Meanwhile, for most types of production, the location of productive
establishments has become increasingly diffused. Producers in different lo-
calities have competed with their nearer rivals in overlapping sales ter-
ritories, shipping from a distance even to customers adjacent to rival
suppliers, but have been prevented by difficulties of transportation and
communication from invading similarly the sales territories of more distant
at least one-third of the supply of a particular kind of goods is supplied by two or more
persons "who, whether voluntarily or not, and whether by agreement or arrangement
or not, so conduct their respective affairs as in any way to prevent or restrict competition"
in supplying such goods.
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producers. Consequently, the typical pattern of territorial rivalry has be-
come one in which the firms in a group of competing sellers change identity
by increments with change in the location of sale. At a place near M's plant,
M may encounter J, K, L, N, 0, and P as rivals. At places successively more
distant to the east, J, K, and L may drop out in sequence, but Q, R, and S
may appear as additional sellers. Similarly, at places successively more dis-
tant to the west, P, 0, and N drop out, and I, H, and G may appear.
In this kind of situation, there is no clearly defined territorial market.
To conceive any designated segment of the territory as the market is to
exclude arbitrarily some sellers who compete with some of those included.
To conceive the entire sales territory as the market is to include sellers who
do not compete with each other. To conceive each locality as a market es-
capes these difficulties, but places each supplier in markets as numerous as
the areas in which he encounters some difference in the group of his com-
petitors; and it conceives him as operating in each such area under the in-
fluence of local market conditions, without effort to establish, for the firm
as a whole, coherence as to prices, sales policies, productive activities, and
interfirm rivalries.
For such a situation, the sharp territorial segregations involved in the
market concept are not appropriate. The interaction of suppliers fills the
sales territory, not in well-defined and segregated markets, each like a fenced
field, but in the way a fog fills a landscape - as a continuum, of varying
density, here thicker, there thinner, without clear boundaries.
In what has been said, there is no intention to deny that in selling some
commodities and services some suppliers, e.g., barbers in a small town,
interact with one another as a coherent group within a definable territory,
so that the market concept can be usefully applied to their activity. Neither
is there any intention to deny that territorial continua are sometimes broken
by natural obstacles, such as lakes or mountain ranges. The argument is
that sharply defined territorial markets are no longer typical and that they
are diminishing in frequency and importance.
2. Commodity Markets
In important parts of the economy, the concept of the product market
is also obsolescent. This is true to a smaller extent than in the case of ter-
ritorial markets; for whereas the difficulties created by distance affect almost
all business, the difficulties created by the interaction of products depend
upon technological relationships that, though pervasive, are not universal.
For products that have clear identities and important peculiarities in use
and that are not part of a joint productive process, the idea of the product
market remains useful. But though there are still many such products,
commodities that do not have these characteristics constitute a large and
growing portion of all goods. Products once made from traditional mate-
rials by traditional methods now compete against substitutes made from
BUSINESS POWER
different materials by different methods. The range of substitution and the
adequacy of the substitutes has been greatly enhanced by the development
of synthetic substances and by the development of new technologies
applicable to natural substances. Analytical designers have made productive
equipment more adaptable and flexible and have developed numerous
modifications of the character and performance of end-products. Through
such developments a particular end-product may result from a variety of
raw materials and productive processes, and what was once a single end-
product may be available as a considerable number of products that, to
varying degrees, differ from one another in characteristics and in perfor-
mance.
Where such changes have been carried furthest, a given type of consumer
demand may be served by a spectrum of commodities, and the suppliers of
many of these commodities may be able to substitute several materials,
methods of production, and end-products for one another in the productive
process.
Difficulties in applying the market concept to such products are created
both by substitution in use and by substitution in the productive process.
Substitution in use creates the possibility that more than one product
should be regarded as part of the. same market. Where there is competition
of substitutes, not all substitutes are equally satisfactory to all who buy for
that use. Recognizing that for this reason the boundaries of a commodity
market have a fog-like indefiniteness, economists concerned with this matter
have conceived the problem of defining a market's boundary as merely one
of selecting a cut-off point for a series of progressively less satisfactory
substitutions. They have considered that the acceptability of substitutes can
be measured by cross-elasticity of demand - that is, by the impact of a
change in the price of the substitute upon the sales of the commodity for
which it is substitutable. In the light of such relationships, they would define
a commodity market as including such substitutes as have a substantial
impact, and would admit that reasonable differences of view about what is
substantial can leave the boundary inexact.
Though the uncertainty that depends upon the opinions of buyers about
the adequacy of substitutes may make market boundaries seem distressingly
vague if substitutes are numerous, if their number and nature change fre-
quently, and if consumer attitudes also change often, this is the least of
the difficulties involved in substitution. A greater difficulty arises where
there is a chain of substitutes for different uses. A synthetic material may
be a substitute for wood in one use, for steel in another, for glass in a third,
and for another synthetic in a fourth. If, in turn, any of these other
materials have multiple substitutes, relationships may exist akin to those
described above for territorial competition. The group of competing pro-
ducers may change in sale for different uses, with particular groups of firms
dropping out and other particular groups coming in for each type of use,
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and with the body of competitors that interact possessing no single identity.
A still greater difficulty arises when substitution in the productive pro-
cess is also significant. In such cases, alternative possibilities of substitution,
respectively appropriate for the buyers' side of transactions and the sellers'
side, are likely to justify widely different conceptions of the field of substi-
tution. To buyers, substitutes are commodities that serve similar uses,
whether or not they are made by the same sellers with similar methods from
similar materials. To sellers, substitutes in the productive process are the
different commodities that sellers can produce with the same productive
facilities. A water company buying pressure pipe may regard steel pipe,
reinforced concrete pipe, and asbestos pipe as substitutes because they can
be used for the same purpose. A steel pipe maker may regard steel water
pipe as a substitute for other steel tubular products that can be made from
similar steel plate with the same equipment. Just as cross-elasticity of de-
mand might be used to define the market as measured by substitution in
use, so cross-elasticity of supply -the effect of a change in the price of
one tubular product upon the supply of another -might be used to define
the market as measured by substitution in the productive process. Both con-
ceptions of the market would include steel water pipe, but otherwise they
would bear no resemblance to each other.
The decisions of a steel water pipe producer cannot be adequately ex.
plained with either of the alternative concepts of the market set forth above.
Such a producer is affected both by the opportunities that it finds for sale
of water pipe in the light of competition from non-steel water pipe and by
the opportunities that it finds for other tubular products in the light of
competition from producers of those products.
The range of prices at which it is willing to sell water pipe and the
amount of water pipe that it is willing to sell depend in part upon the
prices and potential sales of the other products it can make. The cost of
expansion of facilities for water pipe may be that of new plant capacity
if the facilities for other tubular products are fully used, but only that of
converting existing capacity if these facilities are partly redundant. To
treat the opportunities and competitive checks encountered in water pipe
as a complete basis for explaining the producer's behavior in the water pipe
market is inadequate.
Similarly, reinforced concrete water pipe could be appropriately con-
ceived as one of a supplier's related concrete products, and asbestos water
pipe as one of a supplier's related asbestos products. Presumably the deci-
sions of these producers in the water pipe market are similarly affected by
their opportunities in their other product markets.
Relationships of the same general kind probably connect producers of
tubular steel products with producers of steel sheet and steel plate, these
producers with producers of various other metals, plastics, and ceramics, and
so on. Interlinkages of partially non-identical competing groups probably
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cover a considerable proportion of all commodities, though at particular
terminal points the continuum of relationships is interrupted.
To isolate from such territorial and product continua some particular
segment that can be regarded as a self-contained field of competitive inter-
action has become increasingly difficult. The difficulty has been evident in
recent efforts to use market concepts in determining where business power
has become or is becoming unduly concentrated. Under the American law
that forbids monopolization, one matter relevant to the question whether
a firm possesses monopoly power is its percentage of the allegedly mono-
polized market. In certain recent cases widely different conceptions of
market share have been appropriate to alternative definitions of the rele-
vant market.7 The problems of definition have been most numerous and
difficult, however, in merger cases. Section 7 of the Clayton Act, as amended,
forbids corporations to acquire the stock or assets of other corporations
where the probable effect of the acquisition would be substantial lessening
of competition or a tendency toward monopoly in any line of interstate
commerce. In cases involving this provision, evidence that by an acquisition
a business enterprise attained a large share of a market, or enlarged a large
share already held, has been regarded by the American courts as adequate
to show the probability of an anticompetitive effect. Definition of the
relevant market and measure of the acquiring firm's market share have thus
become important parts of contested proceedings. If markets are defined too
narrowly, competitors may be considered to belong to different markets. If
markets are defined too broadly, a significant reduction of competition may
appear unimportant.
But definition of the market has proved an inherently baffling matter.
Confronted with continua such as have been summarized above, the anti-
trust agencies and the defendants have usually proposed market concepts
that differed widely; and the courts have been thus far unable to develop
consistent standards by which relevant markets are determined. Efforts to
define product markets have resulted, in particular cases, in emphasis upon
(a) distinct characteristics in the group of buyers served or in the uses to
which a product can be put, (b) behavior by which firms recognize one
another as competitors, (c) similarity in prices or in price changes, (d) effects
of a price change upon sales of other products, (e) distinct characteristics
in productive facilities, and (f) public recognition that particular firms con-
stitute a significant group.8 In one or two cases decisions have recognized
that a firm's power in selling a particular product may be significantly
7See, e.g., United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956) (the
cellophane case); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
8 The various concepts that the Supreme Court regards as relevant to the definition
of the market were summarized in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
A good analysis of the use of relevant concepts in various cases appears in B. BOCK,
MERGERS AND MARKETS, A GUIDE TO ECONOMic ANALYSIS OF CASE LAw 85-133 (3d, ed.,
National Industrial Conference Board Studies in Business Economics No. 85, 1964).
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affected by its position as an important seller of other products in other
markets. 9
Efforts to define territorial markets began with emphasis upon the area
in which the sales of rival firms overlap. 10 But overlaps that differ in scope
for transactions of different magnitude have been disregarded in search for
a simple definition.1 ' Moreover, some recent decisions have recognized that a
firm's competitive strategy in such areas of overlap may be affected by the
behavior of its competitors in other areas and by its own resources derived
from other areas.12
A growing emphasis upon the significance of potential competition is a
further indication of the inadequacy of concepts of the relevant market. Of
course, economic theorists have long recognized that competition within a
market is affected by the size of obstacles to entry; but they have conceived
entry merely as a means by which, if prices and profits within a market
should become too high, firms that previously had no place or effect in the
market might enter it and enhance competition within it. In certain acqui-
sition cases the courts have found that firms not in a market affect behavior
there, without entering, merely by the fact that they might enter; and have
concluded that market competition is reduced when the possibility that
such a firm might enter is diminished.'3 These decisions imply a concep-
tion of the market that includes not only the firms within it but also those
that reasonably might enter it. Under this concept a market has a wide
but not readily definable extension; for many technologies have expanding
and potentially overlapping fields of application, technical skills and rights
to patents can be acquired, managerial skills are transferrable, productive
facilities can be constructed, and capital can be diverted or raised for
promising ventures. Large firms, well-financed and well-managed, can ex-
pand in almost any direction they think profitable; and in recent years
some of them have expanded into numerous fields for which they possessed
neither previous experience nor appropriate productive facilities.
Since such firms can and do often expand in several different directions,
enlargement of the market concept to include potential competition gives
the enlarged market an increased amount of overlap with other markets.
To give importance to potential competition is to strengthen the case for
the view that competitive interaction is a continuum that cannot be ade-
quately conceived within the context of a particular market.
9 See United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967); FTC v. Consolidated
Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965).
10 In Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962) and in United States v.
Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963), the Supreme Court emphasized that the
relevant geographic market is not where the merging firms do business, but the area in
which their competition might be impaired.
11 See United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
12 See United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966); In re National Tea
Co., [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. RE'. 17,463 (1966).
18 See United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964).
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The diminishing significance of the market concept reduces the ade-
quacy of monopoly of a market as a concept of business power. The curbs
upon power transcend the market. So do the characteristics of the firm
from which power can be derived.
III. DIVERSIFICATION AS THE CHARACTERISTIC PATTERN OF BIGNESS
The concept of the firm as an enterprise that produces a product for a
market and makes its decisions upon the basis of conditions in that market
is already obsolete for many large firms and is obsolescent for more. Instead
of confining itself to a single market, the modern large business enterprise
is typically diversified. The essential characteristic of diversification is that,
instead of being exposed to one coherent body of forces that express
the interaction of a group of firms that supply the product bought, the
diversified firm encounters, in different parts of its business activities, dif-
ferent buying groups, different characteristics in their demand, and com-
petitors that differ in number, size, and significance. Its responses to these
varying conditions can be appropriately varied. It can take advantage, at
any one point, of opportunities that are derived from its activities else-
where. In other words, the diversified firm is not subject to the discipline
of a single market, and can develop company-wide strategies suited to the
interrelations among the problems and opportunities presented by its
various activities.
Since the significant aspect of diversification is the multiplicity of the
firm's fields of action, the effects of diversification can arise, not only
when the firm supplies different products, but when it supplies a single
product under different conditions of demand and supply. Thus conceived,
a firm's diversification has three aspects.
First, the same product is sold to segregated groups of buyers. In some
cases the segregation is the effect of distance. Thus a large producer of
concrete pipe, who cannot afford to ship it more than about 300 miles,
produces in dispersed plants, each of which supplies the surrounding area
under conditions of supply and demand that are peculiar to that area. In
other cases the segregation is due to difference in the nature of the buyers.
Thus a large producer of salt sells his product in bulk to industrial users
and in branded packages to the grocery trade. Whatever the source of the
segregation, the opportunities of the seller and the competitive checks upon
him are likely to differ from one segregated group to another, and to give
opportunity for appropriate differences in his business decisions.
Second, the large firm is usually vertically integrated - that is, it per-
forms a series of operations at successive stages of the production and dis-
tribution of end-products. It may sell part of what it produces at one or
more stages prior to full fabrication. Thus, a rubber manufacturer may
produce and sell rubber but also convert that rubber into tires and sell
the tires.
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Vertical integration often results in a third type of diversification,
variety in the end-products sold. Sometimes the vertically related activities
take a divergent pattern - that is, a firm such as a lumber mill or a steel
producer may make and sell different products that come jointly from
common raw materials or productive operations. Sometimes vertical inte-
gration is convergent - that is, a firm that serves a body of closely related
consumer needs through a particular kind of distributive channel (e.g., a
business machine company) chooses to make different kinds of products
(e.g., business office equipment) which, though not made jointly, can be sold
to the same buyers. The one type of integration results in an enterprise that
sells a line of products bought under different conditions of demand. The
other type results in an enterprise that sells a line of products produced
under different conditions of supply. A firm integrated in either way may
encounter different degrees of competition and different kinds of substitute
products in selling different parts of its line.
A large firm may also sell products that are not related to one another
in either of the foregoing ways. They may be neither jointly produced or
complementary nor substitutionary in use, but dissimilar in kind, method of
production, type of buyer, and end use. Unlike diversified products of the
first two types, such a line of products is the result of no common element
of production or marketing, and hence is unlikely to be the source of econo-
mies in either. The products are merely supplied by the same financial
entity and subject to coordinated managerial control.
But whatever the composition of the diversified line of products, the
different products in it are likely to differ significantly in physical charac-
teristics, quantities sold, costs of production, competition encountered, the
frequency and size of sales transactions, the elasticity of demand, and
the degree to which demand can be changed by sales effort.
In the first and most detailed study of diversification available for the
United States, the Federal Trade Commission reported in 1957 that in 1950,
of the thousand largest manufacturing companies which made about 55
percent of the shipments of all manufacturing companies, only 132 com-
panies were limited to a single establishment, only 243 to as few as three
product classes, only 118 to a single industry, only 164 to a single closely
related subgroup of industries, and only 334 to a single industry group
more broadly defined.14 Seventeen firms operated more than 75 establish-
14 FTC, REPORT ON INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION AND PRODUCT DIVERSIFICATION IN THE
1000 LARcEST MANUFACTURING COMPANIES: 1950 (1957). Breadth of activity is measured by
the Standard Industrial Classification, under which products more or less closely related
are grouped together under a five-digit number and called a product group, related
product groups are assigned a four-digit number and called an industry, related industries
are assigned a three-digit number and called an industry subgroup, and related subgroups
are assigned a two-digit number and called an industry group. An example of a five-digit
class of steel products is "hot rolled sheets and strip, including tin mill products." An
example of a four-digit industry is "blast furnaces and steel mills." An example of a
three-digit industry subgroup is "iron and steel foundries." An example of a two-digit
industry group is "primary metal industries."
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ments; 8 firms shipped products classified in more than 50 product groups;
70 firms shipped products classified in more than 15 industries; 79 firms
shipped products classified in more than 10 industry subgroups; and 82
firms shipped products classified in more than 10 industry groups. The
degree of diversification increased with the size of the firm.15 Less markedly,
the proportion of the firm's total shipments that consisted of its most
important products decreased with size.' 6
The multiplicity of products supplied by the largest thousand firms
appears to be increasing. According to an official of the Federal Trade
Commission, the number of product groups into which the products of the
group of companies fell changed as follows from 1950 to 1962:17
No. of 5-digit Product No. of Companies with No. of Companies with
Groups Shipped by Such Diversification Such Diversification
the Company in 1962 in 1950
over 50 15 8
16-50 236 128
6-15 477 432
2- 5 233 354
1 49 78
Recent information derived from the company statistics of the census
provides much less detail, but appears to indicate that diversification by
large firms has become typical. According to the 1958 census of business,
91,000 companies that operated more than one establishment had a pre-
dominant place in sales and employment. They included about 41,000
companies engaged in more than industry and an additional 50,000 com-
panies operating more than one establishment in a single industry. As a
whole, they employed nearly 54 percent of all company employees and
made nearly 51 percent of all sales (excluding intracompany sales). The
15 Of the 8 firms that made shipments in more than 50 product classes, 7 were
among the largest 15 firms as ranked by total shipments, and the other was among the
top 50 firms. Of the 73 firms with shipments in from 21 to 50 product classes, 41 were
among the hundred largest firms, 28 more among the 500 largest, and only 4 among the
500 smallest.
16Among the largest 50 companies, shipments in the most important industry con-
stituted less than 60 percent of the value of total shipments for 32 companies, and less
than 50 percent for 22. For only 4 of them did such shipments constitute more than
90 percent. Among the smallest 50, the most important industry supplied more than 90
percent of the total value of shipments for 23 companies, less than 60 percent for only 11,
and less than 50 percent for only 4. For 50 companies ranked at the middle of the thousand
the most important industry showed intermediate results - over 90 percent of the value of
shipments for 9 companies, less than 60 percent for 21 companies, less than 50 percent
for 11.
17Hearings on Economic Concentration Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and
Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 157 (1964)
(testimony of Harrison F. Houghton) [hereinafter cited as Concentration Hearings]. The
thousand for 1962 were chosen on the basis of information in the 1962 Plant and Product
Directory issued by Fortune magazine. The group was not identical with the Commission's
list of one thousand for 1950.
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multi-industry companies accounted for most of these percentages - slightly
more than 44 percent of all company employment and nearly 42 percent
of all company sales.
In manufacturing the importance of diversification was even greater:
multi-unit manufacturing companies accounted for more than 67 percent
of all manufacturing employment and more than 73 percent of manufactur-
ing sales; and the corresponding percentages for multi-industry companies
were 59 percent and 66 percent respectively.1 s All but 14 of the 428 manu-
facturing industries contained multi-industry companies. In 84 of these
industries, the manufacturing employees of the multi-industry companies
who worked in establishments classified in other industries constituted
more than 50 percent of the total manufacturing employees of these com-
panies; in 275 industries (including the 84 just mentioned) they constituted
more than 25 percent. To minimize the problems of classifying companies,
135 broader categories of industry were used in reporting company statistics;
but in 71 of these broader categories more than one-fourth of the total
manufacturing employment of the multi-industry companies in the category
was still in establishments classified in other categories.19
Since the Second World War, mergers involving large firms have con-
tributed significantly to the size and diversification of such firms. In mining
and manufacturing, a total of 720 firms with assets over $10 million, aggre-
gating over $23 thousand million, disappeared by merger between 1948
and 1964.20 In only 138 of these 720 cases was the merger merely horizontal
and in only 108 cases merely vertical. In 356 cases it involved diversification
of products, in 48 cases extension of territorial markets for existing products,
and in 70 more cases "other" types of diversification. 21 Nearly 58 percent of
the acquisitions were made by firms with assets of $100 million or over.22
18 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, ENTERPRISE STATISTICS: 1958, GENERAL REPORT pt. 1, at 22-23,
105-06. The census figures cover mineral industries, manufacturing, wholesale and retail
trade, public warehousing, and selected services, estimated to include 53 percent of
national income. In the subsequent report for 1963 which became available since this
article first appeared, the share of the multi-unit and multi-industry firms increased.
The multi-industry firms increased. The figures were: for employment, all multi-unit
companies nearly 56 percent, multi-industry companies more than 46 percent; for sales,
all multi-unit companies nearly 54 percent, multi-industry companies about 43.5 percent.
In manufacturing, multi-unit companies had about 70 percent employment, over 76
percent of sales; multi-industry companies over 62 percent of employment, over 69
percent of sales. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, ENTERPRISE STATIsTIcs: 1963 GENERAL REPORT
pt. 1, at 91-92 (1968).
191d. at 3-4. The 135 categories covered not only manufacturing (for which there
were 91) but also mineral industries, wholesale and retail trade, and public warehousing.
An example of a broader category is that for rubber products, which includes tires and
inner tubes, rubber footwear, reclaimed rubber, and other fabricated rubber products.
20 Concentration Hearings, pt. 2, at 509 (testimony of Willard Mueller, Director of
the Bureau of Economics of the Federal Trade Commission). As used here, the term
merger includes both amalgamations in which firms lose their separate identity and
acquisitions in which one firm acquires control over another or over some substantial part
of. the capital assets of another.
21 Id. at 516.
22 Id. at 518.
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In manufacturing, for which the best figures are available, the 200 largest
firms made 387 acquisitions, with a total asset value of nearly $15 thousand
million. 28 The number of manufacturing firms with assets between $10
million and $250 million that existed in 1964 was only about three times
the number of such firms that had been absorbed, and possessed less than
4V times the amount of the assets of those absorbed finns. 24
Figures like those set forth above indicate the prevalence and impor-
tance of diversification, but since considerable diversification can take place
even within one industry or product group, they convey an inadequate
impression of the variety of new goods supplied by many of the large com-
panies. For example, of the total sales of Olin-Mathieson, which is classified
as a chemical company, about 24 percent were chemicals in 1963, about
19 percent metals, nearly 19 percent pharmaceuticals and drugs, 18 percent
packaging materials, and 13 percent arms and ammunition. The company's
products are estimated at 4500, and include fertilizer, propellants, tools,
paper, lumber, natural gas, cosmetics, electric toothbrushes, and filter tips
for cigarettes.25
IV. THE RELATION OF DIVERSIFICATION TO POWER
As diversified firms become more prevalent, patterns of business inter-
action and types of business power are appearing which are new to economic
analysis and to government policy.
When a firm produces many products, some of these are likely to con-
tribute large parts of its total sales and profits; others that currently con-
tribute little are likely to be considered probable large contributors in the
future; and still others are likely to have little importance in the present
aggregate and little promise of greater importance. Decisions about partic-
ular products in the line are likely to reflect, not only conditions of demand
and supply peculiar to the product, but also the place of the product in
the firm's overall effort to attain satisfactory aggregate results. Unlike special-
ized firms, the diversified firm need not confine its decisions as to one
product within limits set by the risks it attributes to expenditures upon that
product and by the income it derives from that product. Risks and revenues
can be pooled, and action as to any part of the product line can be taken so
far as seems desirable, in the light of the risks and resources of the enterprise
as a whole.
Similarly, when a firm producing many products encounters competition
upon one of them, the significance of that competition to the firm differs
from that of competition encountered by a specialized firm. The specialist
competes with a particular group of firms in one arena; the diversified firm
competes with different groups in numerous arenas, in most of which only a
small part of its total revenue is at stake. The conditions of the diversified
28 Id.
24 Id. at 512.
25 Concentration Hearings, pt. 1, at 168-73; TIME, Feb. 10, 1967, at 90.
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firm's competition differ widely from product to product. For some products,
the competitors are specialists, against whom the diversified firm can use
resources derived from other parts of its business without fear of similar
retaliation. Some competitors, though also diversified, are encountered only
upon a small overlapping part of product lines that are generally different,
so that they too have the ability to intensify the competition by using re-
sources from other fields. Some diversified competitors that sell similar
lines of products are encountered again and again, and strategy toward
them at any one point may be part of a program appropriate to the whole
group of encounters. Any of these types of encounter may have consequences
that differ with the importance that the firms involved attribute to the
products involved - one result if the product is important to each com-
petitor, another if it is important to only one, and still another if it is
important to none.
Many patterns of business decision and competitive interaction ap-
parently develop from different types of competition as to products of
different degrees of importance and from different conceptions of the overall
goals and strategies of diversified firms. Unfortunately for the clarity of
analysis, the more common patterns appear to be also the more complex
ones, in which a diversified firm, in selling different parts of its product
line, encounters specialists and other diversified firms simultaneously, and
in which its diversified competitors at any one point differ from one another
in the frequency of the competitive overlap, the magnitude of their outside
resources, and the importance attributed by them to the products upon
which they compete.
This essay will not attempt either to analyze these complex patterns nor
to list and analyze all the simpler ones. To do so is a task for a generation
of observers and analysts. What will be attempted here is (a) to discuss the
nature of the power of a powerful diversified firm as it may appear in
competition by that firm against a specialized firm selling a product the
diversified firm considers important, and (b) to discuss the curbs upon the
power of the diversified firm as they are likely to appear when such a firm
competes with one or more others of comparable size and similar diver-
sification.
For convenience, the discussion will be concerned with the relationships
involved in product diversification. Similar relationships exist, of course,
among firms some of which are local and others territorially diversified.
1. Competition with a Specialist in Sale of an Important Product
To become big by diversification is easier than to do so without it. A
firm that becomes bigger by producing more of a single product finds its
size limited by the total demand for that product; and in the United States it
is likely to be curbed by the Government's policy against monopolies while
still considerably smaller than the possible maximum.26 Moreover, the field
28Though American law does not condemn monopoly "thrust upon" a business
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of sale for a single product can be dominated only by defeating rivals who
resist vigorously. To do so by merging with them is no longer possible be-
cause of the anti-merger law.27 A firm that diversifies is free from limits
set by the demand for particular products, runs no risk from the monopoly
law if it diversifies further, and may diversify by merger with much less
risk than attaches to other types of merger. The diversity of its sources of
income reduces its business risks and facilitates its access to funds for ex-
pansion. Its ability to funnel its liquid resources into the parts of the busi-
ness where possibilities for growth are greatest gives it special opportunities
to grow rapidly.
For these reasons, diversified firms are likely to be bigger and to grow
faster than their specialized rivals. The following discussion of a diversified
firm's competition with a specialist will assume that the specialist, though
possibly a larger producer of the product the firms have in common, is a
smaller firm.
Within limits set by the antitrust laws, the fluidity of resources and dif-
fusion of risk that characterize the diversified firm give it advantages over
the specialist in the specialist's field of operation. If expansion is desirable,
the diversified firm can divert income from other lines of business, whereas
the specialist cannot, and probably can borrow money on the basis of its
multiple operations and its large size more readily than the specialist, who
must ask creditors to put their eggs in its one basket. If expansion is risky,
the diversified firm can accept a degree of risk for one part of its activities
that is greater than the specialist dare accept for its entire activity. If the
venture loses money, the diversified firm can absorb the loss and continue
if the long-run prospects justify doing so. The specialist, however, is likely
to run short of funds and risk bankruptcy. Hence the diversified firm can
outspend, outdare, and outlose its rival.
Because of the multiplicity of the diversified firm's sources of income,
such a firm need not base its policy toward any one product upon the
profit that can be obtained from that product alone. If, for any reason,
sale of the product at an unusually low profit, or at or below cost, appears
to be desirable, the operation can be subsidized from other parts of the
business. For various reasons, such a policy is often desirable.
(a) In developing new products and in breaking into fields thus far served
enterprise, this immunity applies only to firms that have done nothing to attain or main-
tain the monopoly; and such otherwise innocent activities as persistent expansion to
absorb new demand and offer of the product for lease rather than sale have been held
sufficient to prevent such immunity from being successfully claimed. See United States v.
United Shoe Mach. Co., 110 F. Supp. 295, aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954); United
States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271 (1964).
27 Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964), formerly ch. 25, § 7, 38 Stat.
631 (1914), empowers antitrust agencies to dissolve mergers where there is reasonable
probability that they will substantially lessen competition. For practical purposes, this
means that no large firm can acquire a substantial competitor and that it encounters
considerable risk if it acquires a small one. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370
US. 294 (1962).
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by others, a firm often encounters unusual expenses that for a time exceed
the resulting revenue. High sales expenses or low introductory prices may
be effective ways of overcoming the initial obstacles.
(b) To supply some products free or at low prices is sometimes an effec-
tive way of enhancing the revenue from other products. This is true, not
only in the case of products sold as "leaders" and products given away as
"premiums" but also in many other cases - for example, so called "con-
venience goods" sold because buyers expect to find them in the seller's line
of products, and repair parts for discontinued models of equipment, which
are produced expensively and sold cheaply lest sales of current models be
adversely effected. Products are often sold under conditions of joint revenue
as well as joint cost, and sellers consider the effect of one product on sales
of another where such effects are known.
(c) Within limits set by the antitrust laws28 a competitor can be harassed
by a subsidized low price or by subsidized intensive sales effort. Such
harassment may limit his growth or make his policies less independent.
Equivalent opportunities to subsidize new operations, to exploit the possi-
bilities of joint revenue, and to subsidize harassment are not available to
the specialist.
Deliberate subsidization is supplemented by unplanned and often un-
conscious subsidization. A firm supplying a long line of products cannot
expect to make the same rate of profit upon all items in the line. Where it
encounters little competition, it can seek high profits, setting its prices as
high as its estimate of demand makes desirable. Where competition is
stronger, it can and often does reconcile itself to lower prices and to profits
too low to be acceptable as an average return for the enterprise as a whole.
In other words, it subsidizes the continuance of its more competitive opera-
tions from the proceeds of its less competitive ones. Where such conditions
change frequently, the firm is likely to see them as differences in profit
rates forced upon it by its efforts to meet competition. Where the varying
pressures of competition are relatively stable, however, the firm is likely to
allocate disproportionate shares of its overhead expenses to the more profit-
able parts of the business, thus making these parts seem less profitable and
obscuring the differences in profitability. Such allocations are relatively
easy, and may be made with no intention to misrepresent or conceal; for
most overhead costs are joint costs, 29 even so-called "direct costs" are not
28 The relevant laws are those forbidding attempts to monopolize, price discrimina-
tion, and unfair methods of competition. Harassment indicating a purpose to monopolize
or coerce is unlawful. Under the law of price discrimination, a special price in a par-
ticular territory is likely to be vulnerable to legal proceedings, whereas a special price
upon a particular product is not. The extent of vulnerability under the law of unfair
competition is not clear. In practice, subsidization of sales effort is much less risky than
subsidization of price cutting, and small but sustained pressures are less risky than dra-
matic ones.
29 Equipment costs and administrative overheads are joint among all products using
the equipment or subjected to the administration. Their allocation over time is clearly
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truly ascertainable,30 attribution of costs to particular products is so arbi-
trary that often it is not even undertaken,31 and to consider that costs are
incurred where they can be most readily recovered is easy and attractive.
The result, however, is that costs by commodities either remain unknown
or are computed by arbitrary methods of allocation, and that consequently
an unascertainable amount of unconscious subsidy is likely to support the
continuance of relatively unprofitable activities. In the words of the pres-
ident of Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, "Only by making some
arbitrary split in the finding and producing cost can we arrive at an arbitrary
allocation of profits on oil and gas."3 2
The specialist, who cannot shift costs from his product to others, is
adversely affected when his diversified competitor subsidizes the competition,
whether or not the subsidy is conscious and deliberate.
A diversified firm is also likely to derive advantage over a specialist
from particular kinds of advantages of scale. What the specialist can afford
to spend in research, management, equipment, selling expense, and legal
and political activities is limited by his size in his particular field. Various
large expenditures, though desirable, are likely to cost too much per unit of
product to make them practicable. So far as the diversified firm, in all its
multiple activities, is larger than the specialist, the corresponding limits of
the diversified firm's comparable expenditure are likely to be wider. When
such expenditures can contribute jointly to the success of more than one of
the firm's activities, they can be undertaken if their aggregate effect justifies
them, even though the effect in the field shared with the specialist does not.
Consequently, a large diversified firm, able to afford more research and pay
arbitrary. Their allocation among products may differ widely, not only if it is deliberately
proportioned to relative income received, but also if it is "uniformly" apportioned; for
the results can differ greatly between apportionment proportioned to direct cost, labor
cost, material cost, machine hours, or labor hours. See J. DEAN, MANAGERIAL ECONOMICS
315-17 (1964 ed.).
30 Direct labor expenses per unit vary with output; as costs they are often computed,
not at the actual expense rate, but at a standard rate that is supposed to reflect normal
or average conditions. Direct material cost is affected not only by similar problems of
change with rate of output, but also by decisions about the way changes in material
prices shall be reflected in costs. One method is to compute the cost as though the ma-
terials used were those that have been longest in inventory; another, to compute it as
though the materials used were those most recently placed in inventory; a third, to com-
pute it at some average or normal cost of materials, without regard to fluctuations in
prices actually paid. For examples of the uncertainties involved in ascertaining costs of
products and cost differences in different types of transactions, see H. TAGGART, COST JUSTI-
FICATION (1959) (especially the chapter on Standard Brands, at 39-80).
31 In 1946 the comptroller of the Office of Price Administration reported that only
about 15 percent of all industrial companies, with probably not more than 25 percent of
total production, were readily able to provide figures of cost by products. The other 75
percent of industrial production came from firms that did not purport to compute the
cost of individual products. See ACCOUNTING DEPARTMENT, OFFICE OF PRICE ADMINISTRA-
TION, A REPORT ON COST ACCOUNTING IN INDUSTRY iii-iv (1946).
32 STANDARD OIL COMPANY OF NEW JERSEY, REPORT OF 79TH ANNUAL MEETING 19
(1961).
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more for the less specialized parts of research by others, is likely to have
a better chance for sustained technological leadership. Able to pay more
for top management, it is likely to be well-managed; though, so far as its
managerial problems are more complex than those of the specialist, one
cannot be sure whether or not the differential in managerial ability will
give it any net advantage. Able to pay more for expensive equipment, it is
likely to be better equipped than the specialist with facilities for power
production, quality control, and other aspects of operation which are not
narrowly designed to produce special products. Able to spend more upon
sales effort, it is likely to excel the specialist in advertising in the many ways
that are not narrowly designed to sell single products and in wooing the
various kinds of distributors that are not narrowly specialized; and thereby
it is likely to obtain reputation and prestige that make its selling efforts
more effective than those of the specialist when they are designed to sell
a single product. Able to spend more upon legal activities, it can assert legal
rights more ambitiously and defend them more tenaciously. Able to spend
more upon contacts with government, it is more likely than the specialist
to have a wide network of friendly association with government officials,
to be informed promptly about government activities, and to be able to
influence government decisions; but a part of this advantage may be offset
by its need to be concerned about segments of governmental action wider
than are important to the specialist. Able to spend more upon politics, it
is more likely than the specialist to be able to influence the formulation of
political issues, the selection of candidates for public office, and the extent
and direction of governmental intervention in business affairs. In govern-
mental contacts and political activities, large diversified firms and a few
of the larger specialists can undertake singly types of activity that smaller
firms can undertake only through associations.
The scale advantages that have just been summarized include some that
improve the relation between production and cost for society as well as for
the firm, and some that merely serve the firm, with offsetting disservice to
others. In economic language, they include both economies of scale and
attainment of bargaining advantages. Since the purpose of this essay is to
describe the changing nature of business power rather than to appraise the
changes, no effort will be made to disentangle economies from advantages
where the distinction is not self-evident.
So far as the diversified firm, in its aggregate activities, is larger than
the specialist, it can also undertake more readily such vertical integration
as may be thought desirable. Since raw materials often have multiple uses,
its need for them will often be sufficient to justify self-supply where, in
producing a particular product, neither its own need nor that of the spe-
cialist would justify such action. For such raw materials as are exhaustible,
it can assure itself of supply by acquiring their sources, thus leaving to the
specialist the disadvantage of possible later shortages. Where shortages are
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already imminent, it may be able, by acquisitions somewhat more ambitious
than its own needs might suggest, to confront specialists who need the ma-
terial with the alternative of purchase from it or purchase under conditions
of severe scarcity.
Similarly, since a considerable variety of diversified products often move
through the same channel of distribution, a firm that produces all or most
of them may be able to establish its own distributive outlets when a spe-
cialist cannot. It may thus attain better control over the marketing of its
products, and greater assurance that when goods are plentiful its own
products will be vigorously marketed.
The capacity to integrate vertically is a source of possible advantage
even when vertical integration is not undertaken. A firm that might supply
itself is in a position to demand from its supplier service good enough to
make self-supply unattractive. So far as the price discrimination law permits,
it may buy at exceptionally low prices.33 It may obtain quick delivery,
prompt adjustment of claims for defective goods, first right to buy when
goods are scarce, and various other preferences that the law is unable to
prevent. Similarly, a firm that might distribute its own goods is in a strong
position to obtain cooperation by its distributors. If they want any of its
products, they have incentives to carry as much of its full line as may be
appropriate for their kind of distributive outlet and to give the line
preferential sales promotion. Though the law forbids particular ways in
which a powerful seller may crack the whip over his distributors -tying
arrangements, exclusive dealing arrangements, and full line forcing-so
far as these probably will reduce competition, the relationships that are
forbidden are those that rest on coercion, contract, or discriminatory induce-
ment. The seller remains free to set up his own distributive outlets and the
distributor free to prevent this by voluntarily carrying the full line and
perhaps doing so exclusively. 34
A diversified firm that uses reciprocity as an aid in selling can do so
more effectively than its specialized rival. Reciprocity is a relationship in
which a firm buys from a customer because the customer buys from it.
Casual and informal reciprocity exists, of course, even between small and
specialized firms, but on a scale that is without importance. As applied by
a large diversified firm, a policy of reciprocity involves record-keeping by
which purchases in all of the firm's diverse activities are added into totals
from each source of supply; use of the larger totals by a high-level executive
33 Though price discrimination that is likely to damage disfavored buyers is forbid-
den by law, the prohibition can be avoided in various ways, of which the most obvious
are purchase of goods that are significantly differentiated or purchase of the entire output
of a supplier.
34 Even the scope of the legal prohibitions is uncertain and seems to be becoming
more so. Franchise agreements between producers and distributors are not considered
inherently unlawful and the limits of their legality are uncertain. See 11 ANI TRUST BULL.
417-613 (1966).
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(usually called a trade relations director) in negotiations with counterpart
executives in the supplying companies as to the total amount of the firm's
products that these companies will reciprocally buy; and use of the smaller
totals by the firm's salesmen to increase the persuasiveness of their approach
to prospective customers who are also suppliers. Since the effectiveness of
a request for reciprocity increases with the amount bought from the supplier
to whom the request is made, a firm's ability to use such requests increases
with its size, and diversified firms can use it better than specialists so far as
they are bigger. But they have a further advantage, even against a specialist
equally big; for the diversified purchases of a diversified firm increase the
chance that the firm's total purchases from a particular source of supply
will be large. Moreover, reciprocity can be employed only if the supplier
has use for what the customer sells, and whereas the specialist's single
product has a limited range of uses, the large diversified firm (unless it
produces only consumer goods) not only buys large amounts from a con-
siderable number of suppliers, diversified and specialized alike, but also
offers a range of products some part of which is likely to be useful to most
of these suppliers.3 5
2. Competition with a Firm Similarly Diversified
When one large diversified firm competes with another that is diversified
to a comparable extent and supplies similar products, the types of advantage
that have been described above are available to neither. Neither obtains
from its diversification a special opportunity to be big. Both are similar
in their ability to rechannel funds and spread risks, subsidize one activity
from the proceeds of another, enjoy the benefits of joint revenue, spread
large lump-sum costs over multiple products, undertake vertical integration,
get bargaining advantages from threats to do so, and resort to reciprocity.
The competition of each is a check upon the activity of the other. Of course,
this competition could be set aside by agreement; but if the law is obeyed,
this will not happen. However, such competition is not the same as the
competition of specialists. It has peculiar characteristics that affect the way
and extent to which it limits the power of the diversified firms.
Two patterns of relationship are possible for firms whose diversification
is of substantially the same extent and character. In one of these patterns,
35 Reciprocity has become so important that in 1963 representatives of 118 firms that
were engaged in it attended the annual meeting of a "Trade Relations Association." Of
the firms represented, 105 were among the thousand largest manufacturing enterprises, as
measured by sales; 90 were among the 500 largest; and 52 were among the 200 largest.
The association's board of governors consisted of officials from 9 firms, all among the
200 largest, each of which produced products in from 32 to 128 product classes. (Informa-
tion from a proceeding for preliminary injunction against the acquisition of American
Viscose Corporation in June, 1963.)
The effective scope of reciprocity has been enlarged by three-way relationships: Firm
A, which does not buy from finn C, puts pressure upon firn B, which does buy from C,
to induce C to buy from A. Illustrative examples may be found in Stocking & Mueller,
Business Reciprocity and the Size of Firms, 30 J. Bus. U. CM. 73 (1957).
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the firms differ considerably as to the relative shares of their total sales and
profits that are derived from particular items in their product lines and as
to the relative importance that they attribute to individual products. Where
this is true, the most sensible policy for each firm is to recognize the other's
priority of interest for products important to the other but not to it, in the
expectation that similar recognition will be given reciprocally. Without
explicit agreement, two firms that adopt such a policy accept reciprocally
an allocation of leadership in prices and similar important matters and
obtain thereby considerable freedom of action for the part of their business
they regard as vital. The competitive pressure that each might exert upon
the other and the protection that competition might give consumers of their
products are thus substantially reduced. A considerable part of what is
often described as oligopolistic forbearance probably can be explained in
this way.
In the other pattern, the firms are similar not only in diversification but
also in the relative importance that they impute to their various products.
Where this is true, informal reciprocal recognition of spheres of influence
is not likely. But ad hoc price competition between the firms in selling
their various products is likely to be dangerous. Since each can divert funds
from other parts of the business to support any of its products, subsidy and
counter-subsidy might make such competition very expensive. Since each
could injure the other by a competitive raid upon products more important
to the other than to itself, but each would be vulnerable to retaliatory raids,
each has an incentive to treat competition with the other, not as a series
of different moves separately adopted for different products, but as a
strategy to be established on a consistent basis at all points of competitive
contact. For each, the incentive is to compete in ways that minimize the
dangers described above. If there is price competition, each firm is likely to
limit it in ways that make price wars unlikely -perhaps by use of a
pricing formula applicable to all products or by resort to price reductions
only to reflect decreases in recorded costs or decreases in sales or orders
that are not considered temporary. Competition in sales effort is likely to
be preferred to price competition and is likely to consist largely in activities
that do not pin-point the rivalry of the firms as to particular markets.
Competition in innovation is likely to be considered still more desirable,
partly because it is least susceptible to the raiding type of action and reac-
tion. Where such policies exist, competition may still provide significant
incentives and curbs and significant advantages for buyers; but price com-
petition is likely to be considerably less intense than it might be without
diversification. The relation between competitors is likely to have aspects
of mutual forbearance, akin both in kind and in motivation to that which
is attributed by many economists to oligopoly.
In both patterns of relationship between diversified firms, the existence
of other large diversified firms in other parts of the economy introduces
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another significant competitive check. With divertible funds, diffusion of
risk, and capacity to afford heavy initial expenditures, the large diversified
firm is a potential entrant into many fields that it does not yet occupy.
Whereas a specialized firm, even if large, is handicapped as an invader
of a diversified firm's territory, another large diversified firm is not. Poten-
tial competition from such firms is likely to set limits to what can be done
both by firms that have reciprocally accepted each other's leadership and
by those that have mitigated their competition.
V. CONCLUSION
Because of the developments discussed above, the concept of monopoly
is inadequate to cover the phenomena of business power, and the concept
of oligopoly is inadequate to replace it. Different kinds of power can be
derived from (a) control of a proponderant share of a single segregable
market; (b) position as one of a few competing firms; (c) possession of a
large aggregate of resources in comparison with one's competitors; and
(d) diversity of activities across many fields of operation. The first is properly
called monopoly (though effects partly due to the third are sometimes
attributed to it). The second is properly called oligopoly. The third can
be called bigness, and the fourth diversification. Business power structures
today contain blends of all of these, and hence are hard to describe, analyze,
or appraise on the basis of a single one of these concepts. Discussion of such
power structures gives monopoly an emphasis that it no longer deserves;
attributes to oligopoly a significance greater than it probably has; and
makes little serious effort to cope with bigness and diversification. Yet these
are the forms in which business power is growing most rapidly, is subject to
least legal curb, and is hardest to appraise as to the elements of good
and bad.
